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Abstract
Stephen Kellert (1993) has argued that Laplacean determinism in classical physics is actually a
layered concept, where various properties or layers composing this form of determinism can be
peeled away. Here, I argue that a layered conception of determinism is inappropriate and that we
should think in terms of different deterministic models applicable to different kinds of systems. The
upshot of this analysis is that the notion of state is more closely tied to the kind of system being
investigated than is usually considered in discussions of determinism. So when investigating
determinism corresponding changes to the appropriate notion of state–and, perhaps, the state space
itself–also need to be considered.
1. Introduction
Determinism is generally taken to be a metaphysical doctrine about our world. If metaphysical
determinism is true, then it is reasonable to think that scientific determinism–the determinism studied
in physical theories–would also be true in some form. However, it is a further question as to what
properties a theory or model must have in order to be deterministic.
This latter question usually is much easier to judge in the case of concrete theories than the
status of scientific or metaphysical determinism in general. Laplace’s famous characterization of
determinism (1814/1951, p. 4) is an example of scientific determinism based on the paradigm
theory of classical particle mechanics (CPM). Mark Stone gave a particularly clear characterization
of Laplacean determinism in CPM, where its key properties are seen to form jointly necessary and
sufficient conditions for determinism (1989). In contrast, Stephen Kellert more recently analyzed the
properties Stone identifies as representing layers or levels of determinism (1993, chapter 2).
In this essay, I examine these two analyses of the properties defining Laplacean
determinism, connecting these properties more closely with the mathematical machinery typically
employed in physical theories. There are some subtleties regarding the connection between these
defining properties and states of systems that call the layered approach into question as a way of
conceiving Laplacean determinism, and uncovering these subtleties helps us get clearer about
determinism in physical theories.
     1This is not to say that ontic states have no empirical implications. For example, if there are restrictions on the
evolution of ontic states, then these limitations may very well be reflected in the observable evolutions of
epistemic states.
     2These generalized coordinates allow for systems to be characterized by variables other than linear momentum
and position (e.g., angles and angular momentum).
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2. Preliminaries
Theoretical models in physics include equations of motion (often referred to as dynamical or
evolution equations) describing the change in time of the relevant variables characterizing the system
in question, a complete specification of the initial state referred to as the initial conditions (ICs) for
the model and/or a characterization of the boundaries for the model known as the boundary
conditions (BCs). A state is taken to be a description of the values of the variables characterizing
the system at some time t. As a simple example of a classical model, suppose we wanted to study
the firing of a rubber ball at a wall by a cannon. The BC might be that the wall absorbs no kinetic
energy (energy of motion) so that the ball is reflected off the wall with no loss of energy. The ICs
would be the initial position and velocity of the ball as it left the mouth of the cannon. The equation
of motion would then describe the path of the ball.
It is useful to introduce a distinction that is immediately relevant to physical descriptions,
namely the ontic/epistemic distinction. This distinction is applied to states and properties of a
physical system. Roughly, ontic states and properties refer to features of physical systems as they
are “when nobody is looking,” while epistemic states and properties refer to features of physical
systems accessible to empirical observation.1 Erhard Scheibe (1964/1973) first introduced this
distinction and it has been subsequently developed in various versions (Primas 1990 and 1994;
Atmanspacher 1994; d’Espagnat 1994). An important special case of ontic states and properties
are those that are deterministic and describable in terms of points in an appropriate state space;
whereas an important special case of epistemic states and properties are those that are describable
in terms of probability distributions (or density operators) on some appropriate state space.
Much of the analysis of physical systems takes place in what is called state space, an
abstract mathematical space composed of the variables required to fully specify the state of a
system. Each point in this space then represents a possible state of the system at a particular time t
through the values these variables take on at t. When the state of the system is fully characterized by
position and momentum variables, the resulting space is often called phase space. In typical
dynamical models, the coordinates of such a space are the generalized momenta and positions
characterizing the possible states.2 A model can be studied in state space by following its trajectory
from the initial state (qo, po) to some final state (qf, pf). The evolution equations govern the path–the
history of state transitions–of the system in state space.
However, note that there are important assumptions being made here. Namely, that a state
of a system is characterized by the values of the crucial variables and that a physical state
corresponds to a point in state space through these values. This cluster of assumptions can be called
the faithful model assumption. This assumption allows us to develop mathematical models for the
evolution of these points in state space and such models are taken to represent (perhaps via an
isomorphism or through a more complicated relation) the physical systems of interest. In other
words, we assume that our mathematical models are faithful representations of physical systems and
the state space is a faithful representation of the physical space of the system in question. Hence, we
     3Though the term “differential dynamics” might lead one to think only differential equations are in view in this
condition, it is actually much more general, allowing difference, integral and integro-differential equations among
other possibilities arising in physical theories.
     4As formulated, UE expresses bidirectional state transitions (future and past). It can easily be recast to allow
for unidirectional state transitions (future only or past only).
     5These descriptions can be ontic or epistemic.
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have our connection between deterministic physical systems and their deterministic models,
provided the latter are faithful and have properties rendering them deterministic.
One advantage of working in state space is that it often allows us to study the geometric
properties of the trajectories of the system in question without knowing the exact solutions to the
dynamical equations. But different kinds of state spaces are of different kinds of usefulness. So one
encounters various kinds of spaces such as phase space (momentum vs. position), configuration
space (position vs. time), “Liouville” or density space (e.g., particle density vs. position) as well as
various kinds of transformed spaces, where, for example, the momentum has been Fourier
transformed into a vector characterizing frequencies in the system.
3. Laplacean Determinism
Clocks, cannon balls fired from cannons and the solar system are taken to be paradigm examples of
deterministic systems in classical physics. In the practice of physics, we are able to give a very
general and precise description of deterministic systems conceived of ontically. For definiteness I
will focus on classical particle mechanics (CPM), the inspiration for Laplace’s famous description.
Suppose that the physical state of a system is characterized by the values of the positions and
momenta of all the particles composing the system at some time t. Furthermore, suppose that a
physical state corresponds to a point in state space in an ontic description through these values
(invoking the faithful model assumption). We can then develop deterministic mathematical models
for the evolution of these points in state space and three properties have been identified by Stone as
playing a crucial role in such descriptions expressing Laplace’s vision of determinism (Stone 1989;
Kellert 1993; Bishop 2002; Bishop 2003):
(DD) Differential Dynamics: An algorithm relates a state of a system at any given time to a state at
any other time and the algorithm is not probabilistic.3
(UE) Unique Evolution: A given state is always followed (preceded) by the same history of state
transitions.4
(VD) Value Determinateness: Any state can be described with arbitrarily small (nonzero) error.5
Differential dynamics is motivated by actual physical theories expressed in terms of
mathematical equations. These equations, along with ICs and BCs, are required to be
nonprobabilistic. This requirement expresses the Laplacean belief that there are no indeterministic
elements in CPM like those thought to be present in some versions of quantum mechanics. Such
equations describe the individual trajectories of states in state space.
     6One might wonder about the relationship between DD and UE. After all, ordinary differential equations have
theorems guaranteeing the existence and uniqueness of their solutions so that UE looks like a redundant
requirement in these cases. However, by either underdetermining or overdetermining the conditions for such
equations, uniqueness and/or existence may be lost. More generally, DD allows a great deal of freedom in
choosing algorithms, including algorithms lacking uniqueness properties. Hence, UE is far from a redundant
condition.
     7Historically a fourth property known as absolute predictability completed the picture of determinism as
conceived by Laplace, but the relationship of predictability to determinism is more subtle than typically realized
and the type of predictability implied by DD, UE and VD is also much weaker than often conceived (Bishop
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Unique evolution is closely associated with DD and expresses the Laplacean belief that
systems in CPM will repeat their behaviors exactly if the same initial and boundary conditions are
specified. For example the equations of motion for a frictionless pendulum will produce the same
solution for the motion as long as the same initial velocity and initial position are chosen. Roughly the
idea is that every time we return the mathematical model to the same initial state (or any state in the
history of state transitions), it will undergo the same history of transitions from state to state and
likewise for the target system. In other words the evolution will be unique with respect to a
particular specification of ICs and BCs.6
The importance of UE for determinism will be one of the issues discussed in section 4, so it
is worthwhile to say a bit more about it here. Although a strong requirement, UE is important if
physical determinism is to be a meaningful concept. Imagine a typical physical system m as a film.
Unique evolution means that if we were to start the film over and over at the same frame (returning
the system to the same initial state), then m would repeat every detail of its total history over and
over again and identical copies of the film would produce the same sequence of pictures. So no
matter whether we always start Jurassic Park at the beginning frame, the middle frame or any other
frame, it plays the same. The T-rex as antihero always saves the day. No new frames are added to
the movie nor is the sequence of the frames changed simply by starting it at an arbitrary frame.
By way of contrast, suppose it was the case that returning m to the same initial state
produced a different sequence of state transitions on some of the runs. Consider a system m to be
like a device that generates a different sequence of pictures on some occasions when starting from
the same initial picture. Imagine further that such a system has the property that simply by choosing
to start with any picture normally appearing in the sequence, it is sometimes the case that the chosen
picture is not followed by the usual sequence of pictures or that some pictures often do not appear
in the sequence or that new ones are added from time to time. Such a system would fail to have UE
and would not qualify as a deterministic.
Value determinateness is motivated by the Laplacean belief that there is nothing in principle
in CPM preventing mathematical descriptions of arbitrary accuracy. For example the models of
CPM all presuppose precise values for the constants and variables used in the equations of motion.
This, for example, is consistent with the description of ontic states having precise, definite values.
Clark Glymour takes VD as a necessary criterion for determinism and cites Peirce and Reichenbach
as examples of philosophers who have included this criterion in their analyses of determinism (1971,
pp. 744-5). Since CPM is often taken as the paradigm example of a deterministic theory, it is
natural that VD would come to be seen as part of the Laplacean vision for classical physics. It is
only with the advent of quantum mechanics that questions were raised about the applicability of
value determinateness to all of physics.7
2003).
     8  Even if there is a single function describing the history of the system, such a function still does not imply
the system is deterministic without the faithful model assumption.  
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The Laplacian vision certainly has the flavor of CPM, but as I have described it so far, it
lacks the same precision. By looking at Bas van Fraassen’s analysis of determinism (1989 and
1991), we can add precision to the vision as it comes to expression in CPM, connect it with the
mathematical tools of physical theories, further motivate this formulation of determinism, and
highlight once again the crucial role UE plays in the definition of determinism.
Van Fraassen begins his quantitative discussion by considering the following proposition
(1989, p. 252):
(1) There is a function f such that, for all times t and positive numbers b, s(t + b)
= f(s(t), t, b).
In (1), s(t) is the state of a system at time t and f is a function that maps a state s(t) into a state that is
b time units to the future. This represents a formalization of DD in terms of functions, where
probability is explicitly excluded. As Russell pointed out, however, there is a problem with this type
of functional definition (1953, pp. 401-2). At every instant in the history of the system, there exists
an infinite number of functions describing the same time-evolution of the system in the past, but
diverging in their descriptions in the future (after the time t + b, say). Hence, this definition of
determinism is vacuous because there is never a case where there is a single unique function
describing the evolution.8 Russell’s suggestion for overcoming this difficulty is to characterize
systems by a function making no explicit reference to time. His hope was that such a move would
diminish, if not totally remove, the number of possible functions that agree with f in their description
of the time-evolution of the system up to the time t.
Apparently van Fraassen interprets Russell’s suggestion as an attempt to define determinism
in terms of actual trajectories alone (no possible trajectories allowed). He reconstructs Russell’s
suggestion as (1989, p. 252)
(2) There is a function f such that for all times t and numbers b, s(t + b) = f(s(t),
b).
On van Fraassen’s analysis, for (2) to be an adequate definition of a deterministic model, it must
represent a type of periodicity, but not the functional type where s(t) = s(t + b) say.  Rather, the
type of periodicity he has in mind is UE, where if a system returns to the same dynamical state at a
different time, then it will repeat the same history of state transitions. In other words, (2) must be
refined to
(2A) For any two distinct times t, tN, if s(t) = s(tN ), then s(t + b) = s(tN  + b)
if it is to be nonvacuous. Suppose our system m evolves in such a way that every state in the history
of the trajectory is different. Then it would vacuously fulfill (2). An example would be an Epicurean
atom always moving forward on a trajectory approximately along a line from the sun to the North
     9Semigroups share all the properties of groups except that they lack an inverse.
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Star making an occasional indeterministic swerve. Without the periodicity requirement, (2) would
pick out the Epicurean atom as deterministic which is clearly mistaken.
(2A) states explicitly that if a system returns to the same state at a different time, then it will
follow the same history of state transitions and is an attempt to spell out the requirement of UE.
Since (2A) implies the use of equations of motion as a prescription for the evolution of a system and
satisfies VD in the context of CPM, we can understand the question van Fraassen wants to answer
as being whether (2A) represents a sufficiently strong reading of UE to yield determinism. It turns
out that (2A) is still not enough as there are formal counter examples of models with such periodic
histories that are not deterministic (Montague 1974, pp. 337-9). Van Fraassen’s conclusion is that
we must take possible trajectories seriously when defining determinism–determinism is a modal
notion (1989, p. 255).
  What is needed is for any given state s(t), all possible trajectories issuing forth from that
state have the same history of state transitions. Van Fraassen writes this as (1989, p. 254)
(3) If u and v are possible histories, and u(t) = v(tN ) then for all positive
numbers b, u(t + b) = v(tN  + b).
How is this condition implemented? In CPM it is implemented by using a group of operators
defined by the operation Ub u(t) = u(t + b),  where there exists an inverse operator Ub!1 = U!b for a
one-parameter family, and U!b u(t + b) = u(t). This type of evolution operator corresponds to the
three elements of the Laplacean vision described above. First, as the source for the equations of
motion of CPM, it is a prescription for how to go from one state of the system to another (DD).
Second, the state space trajectory governed by these operators is unique given any choice of initial
state in the trajectory’s history (UE). Third, the group operators and the resulting equations of
motion possess the property of value determinateness as exhibited by the uniqueness and existence
theorems for the differential equations of CPM (VD). Hence, group operators yield a precise
nonvacuous realization of the Laplacean vision with UE playing a central role. By similar reasoning,
we can see that semigroup operators can be used to achieve a unidirectional version of Laplacean
determinism.9
4. Determinism in Layers?
In Stone’s analysis of Laplacean determinism, DD, UE and VD are taken to be jointly necessary
and sufficient conditions for a CPM model (or system) to be deterministic. This is intuitively easy to
see: given a set of evolution equations and ICs and BCs, the state space trajectories of the model
are uniquely determined by the evolution group Ub. For CPM, DD, UE and VD and look like a
packaged deal, given the nature of the states involved (point-like), the evolution equations and the
uniqueness and existence theorems tying the two together.
In contrast, Kellert attempts to argue that DD, UE and VD are separable, representing
layers of determinism (1993, pp. 50-62). Each property represents a layer of determinism, like the
layers of an onion, and as we peel back the layers, we supposedly get closer and closer to the core
of determinism. This analysis of determinism, however, raises questions about logical relations
among states and the evolution equations in deterministic models as well as misidentifies the core
     10Recall that probabilities are explicitly disallowed under DD.
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property of determinism as we will see.
Kellert treats VD as the outermost layer of determinism. Suppose we drop this condition. If
one thinks that determinateness and determinism are closely related–as Glymour (1971)
suggests–then dropping VD would automatically guarantee indeterminism in a physical description.
Although VD appears to apply to CPM, one might worry that quantum mechanics implies that
physical variables do not have sharp or definite values. However, it is possible to revise determinism
to allow for set- and interval-valued properties evolving along uniquely determined paths (Fine
1971; Teller 1979; Earman 1986, 217-8). Properties DD and UE can be applied to the evolution
of interval-valued quantities. So DD, UE and VD, then, do not form a set of jointly necessary and
sufficient conditions for determinism.
Peeling away VD, then, does not appear to be sufficient to render a model indeterministic
and it looks like Kellert’s analysis of determinism as a layered concept proceeds straightforwardly
in this respect. However there is a subtlety involved here. Recall that states are typically taken to be
values of the key variables characterizing the system at some time t and are represented as points in
state space. So a given state s(ta) characterizes a system at the particular time ta. But when we
consider states in conjunction with the evolution equations governing the history of state transitions,
there is a very important dependence ignored in Kellert’s analysis. The three properties DD, UE
and VD are derived from CPM, where states are conceived as points in states space. By dropping
VD, we have actually introduced a change in the notion of state from that of point-valued to that of
interval-valued. For states characterized by interval-valued variables, the state transitions governed
by the evolution operators would no longer be point-valued trajectories in state space, but, rather,
“tubes” connecting an initial interval-valued state with some later interval-valued state in some
appropriate state space. Given the same initial state, DD and UE would still imply that such tubes
exhibit a unique history of state transitions10, so determinism still holds, but point-valued states are
no longer elements of the models. So there is a logical connection between the properties DD, UE,
and VD, on the one hand, and the notion of state on the other. Particular equations of motion (DD)
presuppose particular specifications of the states they govern (e.g., point-like as in VD) in order for
the models to represent well-posed mathematical problems guaranteeing the existence of unique
solutions (UE). The definition of states, then, in a physical theory are not arbitrary, but tied to the
evolution equations governing the states. Making a change in the nature of the state entails a
corresponding change in the nature of the evolution equations and modifying the evolution equations
generally necessitates a corresponding redefinition of the notion of state.
The second layer in Kellert’s analysis of determinism is UE. He argues that UE can be
separated from determinism because chaotic systems can amplify quantum fluctuations due to
sensitive dependence leading to violations of UE (1993, pp. 69-75; see also Hobbs 1991, p. 157).
Briefly, the reasoning runs as follows. Given two chaotic systems of CPM in nearly identical initial
states (e.g., specification of the initial positions and velocities), they will evolve in radically different
ways in a relatively short time period as the slight differences in initial conditions are amplified (so-
called sensitive dependence). There is no known lower limit to this sensitivity, thus nothing to
prevent the possibility of chaotic macroscopic systems being sensitive to quantum fluctuations. If
chaotic macroscopic systems are sensitive to quantum fluctuations, then such fluctuations would
generate slight differences in initial conditions for such systems yielding different histories of state
     11They form a semigroup of operators (see Bishop 2002, pp. 13-14)
8
transitions for chaotic macroscopic systems (Bishop and Kronz 1999). Hence UE must fail for
chaotic models in CPM.
The question of whether such sensitivity arguments do not run afoul of DD’s restriction on
no probabilities is a delicate matter. However, these kinds of sensitivity arguments depend crucially
on how quantum mechanics itself as well as measurements are interpreted (Bishop and Kronz
1999). Furthermore, although in the abstract sensitivity arguments do correctly lead to the
conclusion that the smallest of effects can be amplified, applying such arguments to concrete
physical systems shows that the amplification process may be severely constrained. For example
investigating the role of quantum effects in the process of friction in sliding surfaces indicates
quantum effects might be amplified by chaos to produce a difference in macroscopic behavior only
if the fluctuations are large enough to break molecular bonds and are amplified quickly enough
(Bishop forthcoming).
These questions aside, what would it mean for the concept of determinism if UE were
dropped? I offered reasons in section 3 as to why UE is crucial for any conception of determinism.
The crucial question, then, is whether by dropping UE determinism would be lost if all we now have
is the concept of an evolution equation (i.e., only DD remains). To see this, we can build what van
Fraassen calls a set of “indeterministic counterparts” to the group operators mentioned above that
explicitly lack UE (van Fraassen 1991, p. 51). Let S be a subset of the state space and b a positive
number. Then 
Tb (S) ={x: for some possible* trajectory u, time t, and state y in S, u(t) = y and u(t + b) = 
x};
Tb^(S) ={y: for some possible* trajectory u, time t, and state x in S, u(t) = y and u(t + b) = 
x},
where a trajectory u(t) is possible* relative to v(t) exactly when u(t) = v(t) for all t # t1, but may
disagree for all t > t1. The operation Tb Tb^(S) does not return the original state in S.11 Furthermore
these operators require a change in the notion of possibility from the standard one used in groups
and semigroups. The operators T yield a structure on state space defining a set of possible*
trajectories that can act as continuations of u beyond time t1. Any one of the candidates is a possible
continuant and no one is guaranteed to be the continuant.
Thus UE is lost with no explicit introduction of probability into any equations, hence, there is
no immediate revision to DD which explicitly rules probabilities out. However, clearly if UE is
dropped, then the algorithm in DD is either vacuous (recall (2) and (2A) above) or one-to-many:
given the same state s(t) for any t < t1, the algorithm can map into any possible* state s(tN) for  tN >
t1. If the key intuition is that deterministic evolution must eschew probabilities–as seems to be
Kellert’s view (1993, p. 75)–then that intuition is certainly preserved by dropping UE and keeping
DD. However, the remaining conception of determinism turns out to be simply a methodological
injunction to use differential equations, say, without any inherent stochastic elements, an approach
that has its own problems (cf. Bishop 2002, pp. 26-28). Even if DD remains unmodified, we have
peeled the crucial layer of determinism away by dropping UE (compare Earman 1986, pp. 12-13).
As illustrated and argued above in section 3, UE is the core of determinism, representing an anvil on
9which we fashion our physical theories and models.
Suppose, in contrast to Kellert, we drop DD’s restriction on probabilities, while maintaining
UE as the core of determinism (our anvil). Determinism as UE is still preserved since it is still
possible to have evolution equations that govern the transitions of probabilities such that starting with
the same initial probability distribution (initial state), we have the same history of transitions to a
unique final probability distribution (final state). An example of such a situation would be statistical
mechanics. But notice again that this would involve a further revision to the nature of the states
composing the state space: the states are now probability distributions, rather than point-valued or
interval-valued quantities. So UE holds whether or not we have evolutions equations for point-
valued states or for probability distributions. The different kinds of evolutions equations represent
the various kinds of theories or models we can fashion on the anvil of UE, ensuring that such
theories and models are deterministic.
The interplay between the notion of state and the types of equations in DD also helps to
alleviate a worry for UE raised by Robert Batterman (1993). He notes that UE is “generally false
for so-called time-dependent Hamiltonian systems” (1993, p. 50). I take it that the worry here is
with behaviors such as hysteresis effects, where physical variables become multivalued. Again, what
is important to note here is that the notion of state corresponding to these equations. In this case the
state is such that it never takes on multiple values of a variable (the velocity, say) at the same time t.
The notion of state is, perhaps, more sophisticated than in Newtonian dynamics, but there is nothing
in principle that prevents enriched notions of state and state space, along with the corresponding
evolution equations, from fulfilling UE in these cases.
As a final set of remarks, the connection between the properties of determinism and the
notion of state often appears to be neglected. A recent example is David Albert’s (2000) discussion
regarding determinism and time-reversal invariance. Albert (2000, pp. 9-11) advocates a view that
states should be considered logically, conceptually, and metaphysically independent. This is to say
that the information encoded in the state s(ta) does not determine or imply anything about any other
states at any other times if we consider states in and of themselves. If one considers Newtonian
particle mechanics, specifying just instantaneous particle positions fulfills this criterion fine. If, in
addition, one specifies instantaneous particle momenta as well, then this independence is violated,
because the definition of instantaneous velocity involves infinitesimal differences in position at
different times, since momentum in Newtonian mechanics is defined as velocity–the derivative of
position with respect to time–multiplied by mass. As John Earman has pointed out, physicists usually
do not require this kind of strict independence. Defining states in CPM as s(x(t), mv(t)), where x is
particle position and mv is particle momentum, such a state is not independent of all the other states
in some specified time interval, namely it fails in just the way needed to define v as an instantaneous
velocity (Earman 2002, p. 246). Still, merely specifying the state s(x(ta), mv(ta)) does not determine
the values of all other states in state space for all times, but only those in a small neighborhood about
s. On the other hand, if one considers the Hamiltonian formulation of CPM, where the generalized
momentum is defined as a derivative of the system’s Lagrangian (roughly a function specifying the
total energy of the system), then the generalized momentum need not be of the same form as
Newtonian momenta, so one may be able to specify both the generalized coordinates and the
generalized momenta such that states maintain the conceptual independence Albert intends. 
It is also logically possible that a system might have the same state in two different worlds,
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but not have the same history of state transitions. This, perhaps, is the notion of logical
independence that Albert has in mind. However, in physically possible worlds where the laws are
deterministic, the states would not be logically independent. In particular, under the Laplacean vision
of determinism for CPM, the states are not logically independent of the laws governing their history
of transitions (DD), and, consequently, they are not strictly logically independent of each other,
being linked via the relevant evolution equations, whether the Newtonian or the Lagrangian
formulation is used. The specification of one of these states plus the dynamical equations of motion
would fix the entire history of state transitions so long as the definition of state includes the
instantaneous position and momentum. So the fact that particular forms of determinism presuppose
particular notions of state undermines the kind of strong form of independence Albert advocates in
contrast to the typical view of physicists.
The importance of this interdependency of states and equations of motion for determinism
can be seen in an example given by van Fraassen (1989, p. 256). Consider a pendulum whose
motion is constrained to a plane and whose states s are only characterized by bob position in order
to enforce strict independence of states. Suppose that the bob has a particular location at some
time, whose coordinates are (1,1), say. Since the pendulum is a periodic system, we know it will
return to this location again and again in regular fashion. Characterizing bob positions as a function
of (discrete) time s(t), then s(10) = (1,1). Suppose that s(20) = (1,1). Does it follow from this that
s(11) = s(21)? No, because whether the bob is traveling in the same direction at these two times is
indeterminate. Given a time sequence of positions s(10), s(20), s(30),...there is no way of
determining the values of the other positions. The pendulum, then, is periodic, but not deterministic if
the state space is simply configuration space (x(t)). Of course, when we examine the pendulum’s
equation of motion, we see that it presupposes states characterized by (x(t), mv(t)). So the state
space that allows full specification of the state of the pendulum bob is phase space, requiring both
position and momentum, and determinism is restored.
In contrast to the view presented here, Albert advocates viewing determinism in CPM as a
“connection between all the states of the world at all times and all the states of the world throughout
any arbitrarily small time-interval” (Albert 2000, p. 11). This means that one must specify the states
s(x(ta)) at some time ts and the “rates at which those positions are changing [momentum] in the
immediate vicinity of that time” in order to have a deterministic connection with the positions of the
particles at any other time” (Albert 2000, p. 11). In this way one could overcome the problem of
determinism in the previous pendulum example, because the equation of motion requires a
specification of both an initial position and a rate of change of that position at some time ts in order
for determinism to hold for the system. So, on Albert’s view, since the CPM equations of motion
require both initial position and velocity information, and since the s(x(ta)) contains no velocity
information, one must also specify how s(x(ta)) is changing in a small neighborhood in time about ts.
As noted above, however, states are not strictly logically independent of each other, being
related to one another via the equations of motion, so the drive to formulate CPM in such a way
that particle states have the strict independence Albert wants lacks motivation. It is also the case
that on Albert’s proposal, given a state s(x(ta)) one could not say whether it represented a particle
state in motion or at rest, whereas on the usual physicist’s account this can be read off the state.
With respect to determinism, however, the greatest difficulty with Albert’s proposal is that if the
state is restricted to s(x(ta)) and only s(t0) is specified along with the equations of motion, then the
system is not deterministic (as in the example above). Under this proposal, determinism does not
     12It is possible to have probabilistic descriptions that are ontic with respect to other descriptions
(Atmanspacher and Kronz 1999; Atmanspacher, Bishop and Amann 2002, pp. 64-67).
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have the properties DD, UE and VD falling out of the kinds of laws we take to govern CPM.
Rather, one must decide what additional information is needed beyond s(t0) in order to restore
determinism for CPM, but this renders the specification of determinism ad hoc, whereas the usual
physicist’s way of specifying states leaves the question of determinism internal to the theory or
model in question and well-motivated.
5 Concluding Comments 
From this brief exploration of Laplacean determinism, we can see that the notion of determinism as
a layered concept is more problematic than first meets the eye. DD, UE and VD might be jointly
necessary and sufficient conditions for models of CPM to be deterministic. To drop either DD or
VD might be appropriate for other kinds of models–so these three conditions cannot be necessary
for Laplacean determinism simpliciter–but this also implies that the underlying notion of state
changes in a corresponding way. For example, dropping VD leads to a change in state from point-
valued to interval valued. This might be appropriate for particular kinds of meteorological models,
where variables like temperature and pressure for atmospheric states are specified over some
interval due to measurement limitations and these interval-valued states are then evolved forward in
time. While still being deterministic, this epistemic description could be related to an underlying ontic
description in terms of microscopic point-valued states (Atmanspacher and Kronz 1999).12 As
another example, in statistical mechanics, dropping DD might mean probability densities are being
used in an appropriate coarse-grained macroscopic description of the system tied to the precision
of our observations. While still being deterministic, this epistemic description could be related to an
underlying ontic description in terms of microscopic point-valued states. Alternatively, there might
be cases where an ontic description in terms of probabilities is appropriate when underlying point-
valued states are undefinable. Hence, we have a different conception of determinism suited for
modeling physical systems other than those of CPM.
In contrast, dropping UE does not appear to imply a corresponding change to the notion of
state. For example, whether one uses point-valued or interval-valued quantities–corresponding to
maintaining or dropping VD–specifying the same initial state does not guarantee evolution to a
unique final state because the mapping between states is now one-to-many. Determinism is no
longer valid for such models. Speaking picturesquely, UE represents an anvil and different
combinations/modifications of DD and VD represent different properties relevant for different
models we might fashion on this anvil.
These observations suggest that a layered conception of determinism is inappropriate.
Rather, we should think in terms of different deterministic models applicable to different kinds of
systems all sharing the core property UE. Further, the notion of state is more closely tied to the kind
of system being investigated than is usually considered in discussions of determinism. So when
investigating determinism by adding or dropping such properties as DD and VD, corresponding
changes to the appropriate notion of state–and, perhaps, the state space itself–also need to be
considered.
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